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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE REFORM 
ELEANOR D. KINNEY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has just witnessed its third crisis in the availability and 
affordability of medical liability insurance in thirty years.1  Many physicians 
and other providers delivered health-care services with no liability insurance or 
stopped providing services altogether.2  Physicians and other health-care 
providers, as well as medical liability insurers, are calling for reforms.3  Before 
Congress is the Bush Administration’s proposal advanced as a cornerstone of 
the Administration’s health policy, to modify state tort law by federal law.4  
 
* A.B., Duke University, 1969; J.D., Duke University, 1973; M.P.H., University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1979. Hall Render Professor of Law and Co-Director, The William S. 
and Christine S. Hall Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law Indianapolis. 
I would like to thank my research assistants Scott Wooldridge, Jennifer Wallander, and Carolyn 
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 1. See William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and The Medical 
Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 10.  See generally Kenneth E. Thorpe, The 
Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, HEALTH 
AFF., Jan. 21, 2004, at W4-20, available at http://www.healthaffairs.org. 
 2. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, Rise in Insurance Forces Hospitals to Shutter Wards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, § 1, at 1; Susan Warner, Practicing Without a Net, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 
2002, § 14NJ, at 1. 
 3. American Medical Association, Medical Liability Reform, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/9255.html (“AMA has designated medical liability reform as its 
number one priority.”); American Hospital Association, Health Care Liability Reform, available 
at http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/key_issues/hpl/; MARKET CONDITIONS WORKING 
GROUP, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS COMM’RS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A STUDY OF 
MARKET CONDITIONS (Sept. 9, 2003) (Draft Report presented to the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners), available at http://www.wsma.org/NAIC_medmal_study.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2004); see also Harming Patient Access to Care: The Impact of Excessive 
Litigation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 4. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R. 
4280, 108th Cong. (2004); Pregnancy and Trauma Care Access Protection Act of 2004, S. 2207, 
108th Cong. (2004); Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act of 2003, S. 2061, 
108th Cong. (2004); Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); Patients First Act of 2003, S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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This proposal calls for the imposition of a cap on non-economic damages as 
well as other measures aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of 
medical malpractice claims.  States are adopting similar reforms as well.5 
The latter half of the Twentieth Century witnessed an explosive expansion 
in tort liability generally.6  One consequence of this explosion in tort law has 
been a call for the reform of the state common law tort system and curtailment 
of expanding tort liability.7  Of note, a substantial body of analysis, much of it 
empirical, defends the performance of the common law tort system in handling 
tort claims during this period.8  Like other areas of tort law, liability for 
medical malpractice expanded with changes in rules governing the standard of 
care and a greater willingness of medical specialists to testify in medical 
malpractice cases.9  Subsequently, there have been three crises in the 
availability and affordability of medical liability insurance that have made 
medical liability insurance unduly expensive and often unavailable, which in 
 
 5. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Medical Liability Reform—NOW!: A Compendium of Facts 
Supporting Medical Liability Reform and Debunking Arguments Against Reform 23–35 (2004), 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/450/mlrnowjune112004.pdf; Health 
Policy Studies Div., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Issue Brief: Addressing the Medical Malpractice 
Insurance Crisis (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://www.nga.org/center/divisions/ 
1,1188,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_4703,00.html. 
 6. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1988); TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION, 
AND CONSUMER WELFARE (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, 
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation 
for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75 (1993). 
 7. See Adam D. Glassman, The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice 
Liability Actions: Will They Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417 
(2004); Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. 
ON REG. 435 (1995); STEPHEN J. CARROLL & NICHOLAS PACE, ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF 
TORT REFORMS (1987); see generally American Tort Reform Association, available at 
http://www.atra.org; American Tort Reform Foundation, available at 
http://www.atrafoundation.org; Doctors for Medical Liability Reform, available at 
http://www.protectpatientsnow.org. 
 8. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? 
New Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999); Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of 
Tort Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 
1998); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); 
Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort Litigation Tea Leaves: What’s Going on in the Civil 
Liability System?, JUST. SYS. J., Spring 1993, at 139; Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know 
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147 (1992); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986). 
 9. See Matt Clark et al., Malpractice: MD’s Revolt, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58, 65; J. 
S. Boyden, Jr., Editorial: On the Independence of Expert Witnesses, J. LEGAL MED., July/August 
1976, at 3. 
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turn has disrupted the ability of physicians and other providers to deliver 
medical care.10 
The major critique of the state common law tort system with respect to 
malpractice is that the processes of imposing liability for medical injury and 
compensating medical injury are inefficient and, more important, result in 
inconsistent and irrational outcomes.11  Specifically, it is argued that jury 
decisions and awards in malpractice cases are inconsistent and irrational and 
often based on unsound science,12 a major critique of tort litigation generally. 13  
Further, many meritorious claims are neither filed nor compensated.14  To the 
extent that such eventualities make it more difficult for medical liability 
insurers to predict the outcome of claims, they infuse a degree of uncertainty 
into underwriting that necessarily makes liability insurance less affordable or 
even available.15 
 
 10. Thorpe, supra note 1, at W4-20. 
 11. See Symposium, Medical Malpractice: External Influences and Control, 60 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Lessons for Reform, 54 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1991); Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find 
Relief?, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986). 
 12. See, e.g., Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research 
on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001); Symposium: The American 
Civil Jury: Illusion and Reality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 197 (1998); Christopher E. Smith, Imagery, 
Politics, and Jury Reform, 28 AKRON L. REV. 77 (1994); Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial 
Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors: A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform, 
21 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (1995). 
 13. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN 
THE LAW (1999); Peter W. Huber, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT ROOM 
(1993); Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1637 (1993); Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating 
the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033 
(2001); A. Dan Tarlock, Who Owns Science?, 10 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 135 (2002); David L. 
Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 555 (1995); Jeff L. 
Lewin, Calabresi’s Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 
(1992); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert, 
55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889 (1994); Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Trashing “Junk Science”, 1998 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (1998); Vicki Christian, Comment, Admissibility of Scientific Expert 
Testimony: Is Bad Science Making Law?, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 21 (1990). 
 14. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the 
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996).  See 
also PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION (1993). 
 15. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 15–16 
(2003); MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE REPORT: A STUDY OF MARKET CONDITIONS, supra 
note 3; see generally FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1991); Ralph 
A. Winter, Perspective on the Insurance Crisis: The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of 
Competitive Insurance Markets, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1988). 
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As a result of these crises, medical malpractice has become yet another 
area of state tort law that has been attacked as inadequate to meet the twin 
ostensible aims of tort: compensation of tort victims and punishment of 
tortfeasors.16  Most early reforms of malpractice focused on controlling claim 
frequency or severity through damage caps and other measures.17  Since the 
1970s, particularly in academic circles, there has been considerable interest in 
medical malpractice reform and a plethora of proposals for malpractice reform 
that went beyond reducing frequency and severity of malpractice claims.18  
Such reforms included various no-fault compensation schemes,19 alternative 
dispute resolution methods for adjudicating claims,20 and enterprise liability 
for health plans.21  These later proposals explicitly try to improve the 
malpractice adjudication or compensation system from the perspective of 
claimants and to address negligent medical practice more directly. 
Yet, despite the hue and cry over medical malpractice and the widespread 
concern that medical malpractice law has failed, there has been little 
exploration of administrative approaches to provide systems of adjudication 
and compensation that are more efficient and fair to address the crisis.  
Following the crisis of the mid-1980s, the American Medical Association and 
the Professional Insurers of America Association (PIAA) floated proposals for 
administrative, fault-based systems at the state level.22  However, these 
 
 16. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 46–52 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 17. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a 
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 499, 522–27, (1989); PATRICIA M. DANZON, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 158–173 (1985). 
 18. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future 
Success?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 99 (1995). 
 19. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory 
and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (1998); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative 
Performance of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71 
(1997); Barbara A. Brill, Comment, An Experiment in Patient Injury Compensation: Is Utah the 
Place?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 987 (1996).  See also Jeffrey O’Connell & James F. Neale, HMO’s, 
Cost Containment, and Early Offers: New Malpractice Threats and a Proposed Reform, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 287, 295–96 (1998). 
 20. ELEANOR D. KINNEY, PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS (2002); 
Eleanor D. Kinney, Tapping and Resolving Consumer Concerns About Health Care, 26 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 335, 348–68 (2000); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice 
Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1996); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined 
Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an 
Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89 (1991). 
 21. See William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care 
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (1997); Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, 
Enterprise Medical Liability and the Choice of the Responsible Enterprise, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 
29 (1994). 
 22. COMM. TO STUDY ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYS., PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASS’N 
OF AM., A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF 
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proposals received little attention when they were made and subsequently.  It is 
quite curious that reformers now are not looking to administrative law as they 
have in the past when tort law has failed.  Administrative law has had much to 
offer in the past in curing deficiencies in tort law.23  It has much to offer today.  
This article explores the potential contributions of administrative law to the 
reform of the adjudication and compensation of medical malpractice claims. 
II.  THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
The conventional medical malpractice claim, based on negligence, 
contains four elements.24  First is the duty on the part of the defendant not to 
expose the plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury.  Second is the 
breach of that duty by the defendant’s violation of the applicable standard of 
care.  Third, the defendant’s breach of the duty must be the cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury.  Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered actual damage to a 
legally protected interest.  To establish a prima facia case of negligence, the 
plaintiff must present evidence that the defendant had a duty not to expose the 
plaintiff to a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, that the defendant breached 
that duty as defined by the applicable standard of care, that the breach caused 
the damage, and that there was actual damage. 
A. Problems with Proving Elements of the Prima Facia Case in Medical 
Malpractice 
According to Restatement (Third) of Torts, Tentative Draft, a person is 
negligent when that “person does not exercise reasonable care under all the 
circumstances.”25  Making this determination is difficult particularly because 
the application of this rule is contextual.  It is also the quintessential example 
of a mixed question of law and fact, in which both the court and jury have 
different roles to play in determining the issue and their roles overlap in many 
respects.26  The most important factual issue in this mixed question of law and 
fact is the tortfeasor’s foreseeability of the injury as well as whether the 
tortfeasor breached the standard of care.  The most important question of law is 
what is the applicable standard of care? 
 
RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS (1989); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based 
Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 
(1989). 
 23. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 24. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1061–62 (8th ed. 2004).  See also KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 16, § 30, at 164; KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 70–79 
(1997). 
 25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
 26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 37, at 235. 
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1. Foreseeability of Injury 
The tort of negligence has always wrestled with how to address the issue 
foreseeability of the risk of injury.  In most cases where the relationship 
between the tortfeasor and victim is fairly common—such as a treating 
physician and patient—existence of a duty to foresee injury is fairly 
straightforward.  The analysis then proceeds to whether the tortfeasor breached 
the duty of care—whether he acted as a reasonable person would have in like 
or similar circumstances. 
Duty itself becomes an issue when the relationship between the tortfeasor 
and victim is more unusual and attenuated, raising the question of whether the 
tortfeasor could have foreseen the injury as a matter of law, an issue that the 
judge would decide in a negligence case.  Specific issues include: 1) whether 
an individual has a duty to an injured party if the risk of injury was not really 
foreseeable but occurred, and 2) what is the standard for foreseeability 
particularly when the risk of injury was small and/or the actual injury is 
unusual.  Another related question is whether, as a matter of fact, an injury can 
be considered “caused” by another’s conduct if the injury was unusual or 
occurred in an attenuated and remote manner even though there was a physical 
chain of connecting events following the defendant’s conduct that gave rise to 
the injury. 
Causation has been a point of debate since the early twentieth century, in 
particular since Judge Cardozo’s landmark decision in Palsgraf v. Long Island 
Railroad Co.,27 which imposed liability on a defendant railroad for an injury 
caused in an unusual way.28  There was fierce debate over this issue during the 
drafting the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the 1950s and 1960s29  Even 
today, as the American Law Institute prepares the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts,30 there has been vigorous debate as to whether foreseeability in 
negligence law is a question of duty, which is a matter of law; a question of 
 
 27. 162 N.E. 99 (1928).  See also William Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1953); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 78–80 (1963). 
 28. See, e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 
(1961) [hereinafter Foreseeability]; Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 
60 MICH. L. REV. 543 (1962) [hereinafter The Causal Relation Issue]; Heidi M. Hurd and 
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333 (2002); John C. P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence 
Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001); Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: 
Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071 
(2001); ABRAHAM, supra note 24, at 118–29. 
 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–293 (1965).  See, e.g., Foreseeability, supra 
note 28; The Causal Relation Issue, supra note 28; Prosser, supra note 27; KEETON ET AL., supra 
note 16. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENCE § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). 
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breach, which is a mixed question of law and fact; or a question of proximate 
cause, which is a question of fact. 31 
Another dimension of foreseeability is the degree to which lay perceptions 
of foreseeability are, on one hand, scientific fact, or culturally determined 
and/or socially constructed, on the other hand.  At first glance, foreseeability 
with respect to each element of the negligence case appears to be a 
straightforward question.  The standard of care, in malpractice cases, is a 
matter of medical opinion and scientific fact, while the issue of foreseeability 
is based on common and shared human experience.  Furthermore, the standard 
of care asks, “what would other similarly trained physicians do in similar 
circumstances,” and its establishment is based on expert testimony.  Similarly, 
determinations of causation are based either on lay perceptions of 
foreseeability or causation informed, where necessary, by expert opinion. 
Therein lies the basis for the conclusion that foreseeability is culturally 
determined and even socially constructed.  Proof of foreseeability of the risk, 
factors in the causation of the risk to occur, or breach of the standard of care 
are not based completely on scientific fact, to the extent that scientific facts 
inform the issues.  Intuitive and other considerations are always implicated 
whether the judge or jury is making the determination.  This characteristic of 
the proof of the elements of negligence as culturally determined and/or socially 
constructed effectively gives the judge and jury, as law interpreters and fact-
finders, much latitude in their evaluation and acceptance of scientific evidence 
and other culturally or socially important factors.  This phenomenon may 
explain the debate over whether juries in medical malpractice and other tort 
cases are rational when assessing science and/or awarding damages.32 
 
 31. See, e.g., James R. Adams, From Babel to Reason: An Examination of the Duty Issue, 31 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 25 (1999); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law 
of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 32. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability And Damages: 
Sources of Variability and Ways to Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301 (1998); 
Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 243 
(1997); David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damage Assessments: A 
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and 
Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109 (1995); Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and 
Suffering: A Method For Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages For Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 
CAL. L. REV. 773 (1995); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical 
Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997 (1990).  But see, 
e.g., Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-Verdict Adjustments of 
Those Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1999); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American 
Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998); Neil Vidmar, Pap and 
Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the Tort 
System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205 (1994); Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep 
Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 217 (1993).  See also Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil 
Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996). 
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2. The Standard of Care 
The determination of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, in 
most jurisdictions,33 is what a reasonable physician in the same specialty 
would do in like or similar circumstances.34  In medical malpractices cases, the 
determination of this standard is ceded to the medical profession.  As a 
practical matter, the standard is set in individual malpractice cases through 
expert testimony of what one or more experts believe to be the relevant 
standard of care.35  That expert is not required to substantiate his or her opinion 
of the standard of care with references to outside sources such as medical 
textbooks by acknowledged experts or medical practice guidelines and other 
medical standards of care by medical specialty societies, voluntary health 
organizations, or other medical professional groups. 
Currently, the medical standard of care in a medical malpractice case is 
really a matter of public policy on science, even though in malpractice cases, 
due to the role of the jury and reliance on expert witnesses, its establishment is 
based on culturally determined perceptions or social constructs.  As a matter of 
science policy, the standard of medical care in a community or a specialty 
really could and should be established by reference to more valid and 
verifiable expert authority in medical malpractice litigation.  Reliance on the 
oral testimony of individual physicians is really an inefficient and unreliable 
way of getting information about the standard of care and its application to the 
fact-finders. 
Today, with the evolution of evidence-based medicine,36 the standard of 
care is becoming a matter of a consensus of medical science based on 
 
 33. See David M. Epstein, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Physician’s Admission of 
Negligence as Establishing Standard of Care and Breach of that Standard, 42 A.L.R.5TH 1 
(1996); James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of “Locality Rule” in Malpractice 
Action Against Physician Who is Not a Specialist, 99 A.L.R.3D 1133 (1980); James Duff, Jr., 
Annotation, Malpractice Testimony: Competency of Physician or Surgeon from One Locality to 
Testify, in Malpractice Case, as to Standard of Care Required of Defendant Practicing in Another 
Locality, 37 A.L.R.3D 420 (1971). 
 34. See Lori Rinella, Comment, The Use of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation—Should Practice Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L. 
REV. 337, 346 (1995); John C. Drapp III, Comment, The National Standard of Care in Medical 
Malpractice Actions: Does Small Area Analysis Make It Another Legal Fiction?, 6 QUINNIPIAC 
HEALTH L.J. 95, 97 (2003); Sam A. McConkey IV, Comment, Simplifying the Law in Medical 
Malpractice: The Use of Practice Guidelines as the Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 491, 496 (1995). 
 35. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Empirical Evidence and Malpractice Litigation, 37 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 757, 758 (2002). 
 36. See, e.g., DAVID L. KATZ, CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY & EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL REASONING & RESEARCH (2001); DAVID L. SACKETT 
ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: HOW TO PRACTICE AND TEACH EBM (2d ed. 2000); 
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empirical evidence.  Specifically, since the 1980s, three developments have 
driven the expanded and increasingly sophisticated 
use of medical standards of care in the delivery of health-care services in the 
United States today: (1) the standard-setting movement of the 1980s, with 
leadership from medical specialties and pressure from third-party payers; (2) 
the rise of managed care in the late 1990s, with health plans and providers 
delivering care in integrated delivery systems with computerized patient 
records systems; and (3) advances in the theory and science of defining, 
measuring, and improving the quality of medical care.37 
The medical profession has clearly embraced medical practical guidelines, 
based on empirically derived medical evidence and developed in transparent 
and inclusive processes to be a conclusive consensus of experts on what is the 
standard of care from a medical perspective in treating a particular medical 
condition.  Today there are thousands of medical standards of care used in 
nearly all clinical settings to guide medical practice and to asses the quality of 
care.  Clearly, from the perspective of the medical profession the standard of 
care is a carefully considered matter of scientific fact supported by empirical 
evidence. 
Yet, in tort litigation, the standard of care is much more haphazardly 
determined.  In an individual case, it can be set by reference to applicable 
standards of care as though the unsubstantiated opinion of one practitioner with 
minimal credentials.  There is vocal criticism that medical experts are not 
acknowledged or established as experts in their field and that their testimony 
does not comport with the best science available.38  While the Supreme Court 
has attempted to improve judicial gatekeeping on the admissibility of expert 
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence,39 apparently these decisions 
have not had a major impact on the use of expert testimony in medical 
malpractice cases.40  In sum, it is clear that the current methodology for 
determining the standard of care and its breach in medical malpractice lawsuits 
has not kept up with the state of the art in modern medicine. 
 
DANIEL J. FRIEDLAND ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL 
PRACTICE (1998). 
 37. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Brave New World of Medical Standards of Care, 29 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 323 (2001). 
 38. See Special Issue: Evidence: Its Meanings in Health Care and in Law, 26 J. HEALTH 
POL., POL’Y & L. 191 (2001). 
 39. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 40. See Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 267 (2001). 
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3. The Measure of Damages 
The determination of damages in medical malpractice cases is likewise 
established primarily through expert testimony of economists.41  However, 
critics argue that damage awards are inconsistent in similar cases without 
justification or rationale especially when juries are making determinations.42  
Of note, empirical information suggests that jury damage awards are not as 
erratic as critiques suggest and are generally consistent with other legal 
decision makers.43  However, medical science can also be brought to bear in 
assessing the severity and duration of injury and can be harnessed to determine 
the appropriate level of compensation for particular injuries of various 
severities and durations in a democratic manner. 
III.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO THE RESOLUTION OF TORT 
CLAIMS 
For the determination and proof of each element of the tort of medical 
malpractice, administrative law offers helpful approaches for reform.  Outlined 
below are administrative law approaches to reform that might well be applied 
to the adjudication of the elements of the prima facia case and also the 
defenses in a medical malpractice claim. 
A. Theoretical Issues 
Important theoretical issues arise when administrative law approaches are 
used to resolve any public policy issue.  Specifically, under administrative law 
theory, the state should establish public adjudication systems only for 
regulatory or benefactory programs that benefit the public generally.  The 
legislature should not intervene where a problem involves individuals in their 
private affairs.  State courts wrestled with this distinction in the early 
Twentieth Century when they sought to improve the adjudication and 
compensation of injuries on the job with administrative workers compensation 
schemes.44 In many states, there were challenges to these schemes on grounds 
that they inappropriately replaced common law tort remedies.45 
 
 41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 188–
89 (5th ed. 1984). 
 42. See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text. 
 43. See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison 
of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 770 (1999); Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. 
Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of 
Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 896 (1993). 
 44. ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION § 42.23, at 7–651 (1987). 
 45. See Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (1911) (invalidating New York State’s 
original workers’ compensation statute).  But see N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 
(1917) (upholding the amended New York workers’ compensation statute).  See also Helfrick v. 
Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 176 N.E. 141 (1931). 
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In its 1932 decision, Crowell v. Benson,46 the United States Supreme Court 
recognized this public-private distinction with respect to a federally sponsored 
workers’ compensation program with adjudication of claims by the agency.  In 
concluding that adjudications could proceed before the administrative agency 
rather than an Article III court, the Court decided on grounds that judicial 
review was available to review the administrative decisions.  Since Crowell v. 
Benson, the Supreme Court has become much more comfortable in drawing 
the line of public law to include threats to health and safety of individuals and 
the population.47 
Indeed, public administrative law has been an important source of reform 
concepts when tort law has failed.  When automobile accidents and insurance 
therefore became problematic in the 1950s and 1960s, reformers looked to 
statutory no-fault compensation plans to adjudicate and compensate auto 
accident claims.48  As part of the debate over statutory compensation schemes 
for auto accidents, Guido Calabresi wrote his famous critique of the tort system 
as an inefficient means for minimizing the cost of accidents—one of the most 
persistent condemnations of the common law tort system even today.49 More 
recently, in so-called mass tort litigation, courts have used administrative law 
approaches to adjudicate claims for injury and damage.  For example, in 
asbestos litigation, a special master of the federal district court, functioning 
much like an administrative agency, adjudicates and compensates individual 
damage claims.50 
In the 1960s, administrative law took on a greater role in regulating risks to 
heath and safety.  In the 1960s and 1970s, in response to public concerns about 
environmental pollutions and industrial technology, Congress enacted 
 
 46. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).  See Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and 
Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: 
Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of “Constitutional Fact,” 80 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932); Judicial Review of Administrative Findings—Crowell v. Benson, 41 
YALE L.J. 1037 (1932). 
 47. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. 
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Reno v. 
Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); 
Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
 48. See ROBERT E. KEETON & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC 
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965); WALTER J. BLUM & 
HARRY KALVEN, JR., PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM: AUTO 
COMPENSATION PLANS (1965). 
 49. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
 50. See Steven Kazan, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Ethics, & 
Solutions: Legislative Attempts to Address Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 227 (2003); 
Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721 (2002); 
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM 
REPORT (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/publications; see also Asbestos Litigation 
Crisis: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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numerous statutes to regulate risk to health and safety from a wide variety of 
sources and activities in the environment and the workplace.51 The regulatory 
programs under these statutes raised a host of complex scientific issues the 
accurate resolution of which was crucial for effective and publicly accepted 
regulation.  By the 1970s, making decisions about scientific issues in a 
democratic manner was a central mission of administrative law.52 
As administrative law has matured, it has moved beyond concerns about 
whether a matter is sufficiently public to be handled by public law and 
therefore administrative agencies—particularly when matters of human health 
and safety are involved.  Mature administrative law is now much more 
concerned with crafting effective procedures for policy-making and dispute 
resolution.  For example, it is concerned with assuring that scientific and 
technical information used to solve public law problems, such as threats to 
human health and safety, are accurate and reconciled in a way that results in 
sound and fair policies and decisions. 
One of the greatest contributions of administrative law is the recognition 
that policy-making processes, rather than adjudication, are best for determining 
many factual issues based on physical or social sciences. Often, facts involving 
 
 51. See, e.g., Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 1–5, 83 
Stat. 275, 275–278 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531); National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321); Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 7401); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136); Noise 
Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
4901); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, §§ 1–3, 86 Stat. 47 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
523, 88 Stat. 1660 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201); Toxic Substances Control Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601); Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as 
amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801); Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 
Stat. 1393 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 201); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. 
L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685, Pub. L. No. 95-190 § 326(b), 91 Stat. 1404, 1405 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251); National Ocean Pollution 
Research and Development and Monitoring Planning Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-273, 92 Stat. 
228 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1701); Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1221); Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 18 (Table 1.2) (2002). 
 52. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1403 (1983); David L. Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977); Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 
AM. SCIENTIST 505 (1975). 
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physical or social science do not vary in the cases of individual regulated 
parties.  Further adjudicative proceedings are established through expert 
testimony.  Variations in the knowledge and experience of experts tend to 
result in variations in the determination of scientific facts that may not be 
accurate. 
Further, administrative law theory recognizes that such facts can be 
determined in a systematic manner marshaling relevant empirical information 
and are not adduced solely by the descriptive observation of individual fact-
finders or expert witnesses.  An example of this phenomenon, which is 
particularly apt in the case of tort, is the use of scientific methods in risk 
analysis by regulatory agencies.53  These concepts and how they could be used 
to improve medical malpractice adjudication and compensation are explained 
in detail below. 
B. The Concept of “Legislative Facts” and its Application to Malpractice 
The late Professor Kenneth Culp Davis articulated the concept of 
“legislative facts” in the 1940s.54  According to Professor Davis, “[l]egislative 
facts do not usually concern the immediate parties but are the general facts 
which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and discretion.” 55  
Legislative facts are distinguished from “adjudicative facts,” which Professor 
Davis describes as “[f]acts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and 
activities.”56 
Policy-making processes, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking under § 
553 of the Federal Administrative Procedures Act57 are most appropriate for 
determining legislative facts.  These processes enable decision makers to 
marshal all relevant scientific information in its original format, e.g., published 
articles, peer-reviewed empirical research, governmental studies and reports, as 
well as commentary of acknowledged experts.  In addition, interested parties 
can put information before the decision maker. 
Furthermore, how scientific facts should be used in applying legal 
standards are, in the words of Professor Lon Fuller, “polycentric” issues, 
involving multiple considerations many of which are really policy or even 
moral judgments.58  Adjudication is not a good decision-making process for 
determining these kinds of polycentric issues, according to Professor Fuller.  
Adjudication does not flush out all the important considerations needed to 
 
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 104–117. 
 54. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to the Problems of Evidence in the Administrative 
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942). 
 55. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979). 
 56. Id. 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). 
 58. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–404 
(1978). 
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make sound determinations of legislative fact.  One reason for this 
phenomenon is that the placement of facts before the decision maker is 
generally in the control of the parties and not the decision makers.  Further, the 
information must generally be relevant to the dispute at issue and thus 
information that addresses broader policy concerns may not get before the 
decision maker. 
In sum, legislative facts ideally should not be established in an adjudicative 
proceeding that does not permit the consideration of all the factors that are 
considered in determining questions of law, policy, and discretion.  Rather, 
legislative facts should be developed in a legislative-type process such as a 
legislative hearing in which the conveners can marshal all relevant information 
in a systematic fashion from all interested and affected parties. 
1. Use of Legislative Facts in Adjudication 
This important distinction in the nature of factual determinations and the 
appropriate process for making these determinations has become well-
developed in administrative law.  Administrative law theory prefers informal 
policy-making processes for determining legislative facts.59  Indeed, current 
administrative law theory eschews using trial-type proceedings in rulemaking 
because it contributes little to the accurate determination of legislative facts.60 
Furthermore, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,61 the United States Supreme Court made it 
very clear that an agency could determine an important scientific fact, i.e., the 
environmental risks posed by nuclear waste, in an informal rulemaking 
proceeding and then subsequently use that fact in making a decision in an 
adjudicative proceeding. 
Currently, many agencies routinely determine legislative factual issues in 
policy-making processes independently of the adjudication in which they may 
be raised.62  Further, when issues involving legislative facts arise in 
adjudicative hearings, the administrative law doctrine of “official notice” is 
available to permit admission of legislative facts into evidence without 
preparing a foundation with an expert witness.63 
 
 59. See 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.4, at 23 (2d ed. 
1980). 
 60. See Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability (Recommendation 
No. 72–5), 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,782 (July 23, 1973).  See also United States v. Fla. E. Coast 
Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
 61. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  See Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, 
and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345 (1978). 
 62. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to 
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1072–77 (1989). 
 63. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.4.8, at 229–
34 (2d ed. 2001). 
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A great example of how an agency recently used a policy-making process 
to establish legislative facts that were relevant in its adjudicative proceedings is 
the promulgation of its medical-vocational guidelines used in determining 
disability for Social Security programs as a legislative rule by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA).64  SSA promulgated these regulations in the 
1980s in order to bring more consistency to the determination of qualification 
for disability benefits at a time when demand for benefits was growing 
dramatically and SSA had great concerns about inequities resulting from 
inconsistent testimony of vocational experts about the existence of jobs in the 
national economy.65  The Social Security Act provides that a claimant, 
not only [be] unable to do his previous work but [must be unable], considering 
his age, education, and work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of 
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of 
whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a 
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied 
for work.66 
The medical-vocational guidelines are basically decision trees to be 
followed in determining whether jobs exist in the national economy for 
individuals with specific characteristics with respect to degree of impairment, 
age, education, and work experience.67 The guidelines commence with the 
recognition that there are certain impairments that are so severe that no one 
with the impairment could pursue any gainful work. 68  If the claimant has such 
an impairment, disability is determined with no further adjudication. 
The guidelines then delineate the elements of the statutory elements that 
are relevant in determining whether a claimant is qualified for benefits.  These 
elements include whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his 
former work or some less demanding employment, and if not, whether the 
claimant retains the capacity to pursue less demanding work elsewhere.69  To 
address this second element, the regulation requires an assessment of the 
claimant’s present job qualifications according to the following relevant 
 
 64. Rules for Adjudicating Disability Claims in Which Vocational Factors Must be 
Considered, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (Nov. 18, 1978) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P (2004)). 
 65. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., “Substantially Limited” Protection from Disability 
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of 
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409 (1997). 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2000).  The Social Security Act authorizes two disability 
programs: the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434 
(2000), id. at § 423 (schedule of benefits), and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, id. 
at § 404.  The federal government contracts with states to determine disability under both 
programs.  Id. at § 423.  The definitions of disability for the SSI program are those used for the 
SSDI program.  Id. at § 416. 
 67. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P. 
 68. See id. at § 404.1520(d) (referring to impairments listed at pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1). 
 69. See id. at § 404.1520(e)–(f). 
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factors: physical ability, age, education, and work experience.70  Then a 
determination occurs of whether jobs exist in the national economy that a 
person with the claimant’s qualifications could perform.71  The decision maker 
matches the claimant’s specific characteristics regarding degree of impairment, 
age, education and work experience, all matters of adjudicative fact, with the 
factors in the guidelines.  The decision maker then follows the decision trees to 
determine whether a suitable job in the national economy, a matter of 
legislative fact, exists for the claimant.72  These guidelines eliminate the need 
to call vocational experts to establish the existence of suitable jobs in the 
national economy. 
The medical-vocational guidelines have withstood legal challenge,73 as 
well as widespread criticism.74  In Sullivan v. Zebley, the United States 
Supreme Court delineated the dimensions of their use but did not invalidate the 
guidelines.75  These guidelines are now an accepted part of Social Security 
disability determinations.  To gain this acceptance, they have had to function 
relatively effectively and fairly.  One reason for their success may be the 
specificity in addressing most conceivable variations that claimants exhibit 
with respect to physical ability, age, education and work experience.  The 
experience with these guidelines has much to offer malpractice litigation, 
particularly with respect to defining and applying the applicable standard of 
care and also in determining damages. 
2. Using Legislative Facts to Establish the Standard of Care 
The concept of legislative fact can make an important contribution to the 
establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.  As 
discussed above,76 the standard of care for diagnosis and treatment of a disease 
or injury is really a quintessential matter of legislative fact.  Also as discussed 
above,77 the establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases 
involves the testimony of often only one physician who testifies, based on 
 
 70. Id. at § 404.1520(g). 
 71. Id. at §§ 404.1520(f), .1566 to .1569. 
 72. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 (2004). 
 73. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 
 74. See generally Mark S. Smith, Heckler v. Campbell and the Grid: Are Disability 
Claimants Entitled to Examples of Suitable Jobs?, 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 501 (1984); John J. 
Capowski, Accuracy and Consistency in Categorical Decision-Making: A Study of Social 
Security’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines—Two Birds with One Stone or Pigeon-Holing 
Claimants?, 42 MD. L. REV. 329 (1983). 
 75. 493 U.S. 521 (1990).  See Richard P. Weishaupt & Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: 
New Disability Standards for Indigent Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 539 (1991). 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 54–75. 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 33–40. 
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anecdotal experience, as to what is the applicable standard of care in a given 
case. 
Recognition that standard-setting is a matter of legislative fact permits 
greater policing and possibly even elimination of expert testimony to establish 
the standard of care—thus addressing a persistent complaint about current 
malpractice litigation.78  The standard of care for the diagnosis and treatment 
of disease and injury is a legislative fact in that it can be established without 
reference to particular individuals.  This is not to say that there is not variation 
in the course of disease or injury in specific individuals, but again, these 
variations generally depend on factors particular to classes of human beings 
and not on factors that, as a rule, exist in only one individual.  In the latter case, 
individual variation would be an adjudicative fact, but to the extent that 
specific variations are predictable across human beings, their determination 
would be a matter of legislative fact.  If the variation were not unique to the 
claimant, how the physician should have addressed the variation could be 
included in a medical practice guideline and determined as a legislative fact. 
Medical practice guidelines are “systematically developed statements of 
recommendation for patient management to assist practitioner and patient 
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”79  
Another definition is “[s]tandardized specifications for care developed by a 
formal process that incorporates the best scientific evidence of effectiveness 
with expert opinion.”80  They are among an array of medical standards of care 
used for various purposes in the delivery of health care.81  Since their 
emergence on a widespread basis in the 1980s, medical practice guidelines 
have become increasingly widespread and sophisticated.  The guidelines have 
moved from statements of procedures that constitute good quality care to 
detailed decision trees that guide steps in care depending on patient-specific 
variables.82  Now medical practice guidelines, medical standards of care and 
the theoretical foundation of evidence-based medicine are well-accepted in 
medical circles.83  They are also now widely accessible through the National 
Guideline Clearinghouse™ (NGC™), which is a public resource for evidence-
 
 78. See supra text accompanying notes 54–75. 
 79. COMM. TO ADVISE THE PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, INST. 
OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM (Marilyn J. Field 
& Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990). 
 80. Lucian L. Leape, Practice Guidelines and Standards: An Overview, 16 QUALITY REV. 
BULL. 42, 43 (1990). 
 81. Id.  See also Cynthia D. Mulrow & Kathleen N. Lohr, Proof and Policy from Medical 
Research Evidence, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 249, 260 (2001). 
 82. Kinney, supra note 37, at 325. 
 83. See, e.g., Mulrow & Lohr, supra note 81, at 261; Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-
Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on 
the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479 (2004). 
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based clinical practice guidelines within the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) of the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS).84 
When medical specialty societies began developing and publishing 
medical practice guidelines on a widespread basis in the 1980s, scholars and 
other reformers immediately recognized their potential for rationalizing the 
standard of care in medical malpractice adjudication.85  Further, there have 
been proposals to use these various standards of care to better manage the 
establishment of the standard of care in medical malpractice cases.86  The state 
of Maine established a demonstration to test the use of medical practice 
guidelines only as an affirmative defense for physicians in malpractice cases.87  
Notably, however, guidelines were not often used in this manner during course 
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The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 421 (1994); Troyen A. 
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Liability of Physicians, 263 JAMA 1556 (1990); Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health 
Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice 
Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1989); Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical 
Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119 (1991); Eleanor D. 
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Environment: Problems and Possibilities, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421 (1989). 
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Practice Guidelines Reduce the Number and Costs of Malpractice Claims?, 266 JAMA 2856 
(1991); see also CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM (1995); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines as Legal 
Standards Governing Physician Liability, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (1991); Clark C. 
Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical Care: The Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
777 (1990). 
 87. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2971–79 (West Supp. 1993–1994). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 63 
of the demonstration.88  Some states have also permitted use of medical 
practice guidelines as an affirmative defense in malpractice cases while others 
permit both sides to introduce guidelines into evidence.89 
As a practical matter, it appears the medical practice guidelines or other 
medical standards of care have been used to prove the standard of care in 
medical malpractice cases.  However, they may not have lived up to their 
potential.  In addition to data on the Maine demonstration,90 a 1996 empirical 
study of fifty-four cases that mentioned societies or agencies that issue practice 
guidelines reported that only twenty-eight had used medical practice guidelines 
in proving the standard of care.91  Perhaps this is because medical practice 
guidelines are not specific enough to delineate all the circumstances that could 
go wrong in the course of a medical procedure or the treatment of a disease or 
injury. 
One approach to improving the usefulness of medical practice guidelines 
in the establishment of the standard of care is to develop standards that are 
specifically targeted at setting the standard of care in malpractice cases.  This 
is not a new concept.  In the past, theorists interested in establishing no-fault 
compensation schemes for malpractice have identified circumstances in which 
medical treatment falls below the standard of care and should be compensated 
without further consideration fault.92  The most prominent theory of late is 
accelerated compensation events, developed by Bovbjerg and Tancredi.93  
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TIMES, Aug. 19, 1994, at A23; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. HRD-94-8, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE: MAINE’S USE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS (1993), available at 
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They propose an “avoidable event” approach to compensation reform, 
developed independently by experts and contained in lists of events that are 
deemed avoidable through better systems of care.  These lists of compensable 
events, which are really based on medical practice guidelines, have been 
explored primarily in the development of no-fault reform.94  More recently, a 
forum of stakeholders has established a list, in a consensus process, of events 
that should “never” happen in the provision of care.95  All of these events 
schemes could be developed further to apply to all malpractice adjudication. 
The policy-making process should also be designed to identify all the 
variables that would influence the application of the guideline so that 
variations and responses thereto can be incorporated into the guideline.  Such 
variables would include the array of remedies for the medical condition in 
question and the reasons for selecting specific remedies, important patient 
variations, important geographic variables, and also different approaches based 
on recognized differences in the medical training of schools of physicians, e.g., 
allopathy, homeopathy and osteopathy.  It is important that the guidelines are 
specific enough to address most common patient variations in their application.  
For example, if there is a known complication among a subset of patients, the 
complication should be addressed in the guideline, the patient variables that 
precipitate the complication should be identified, and the recommended 
approaches for addressing the complication should be specified.  If the medical 
practice guideline is too general and does not address known variations in its 
application, then the application of the guideline to specific plaintiffs will 
inevitably be decided by adjudicative facts that are particular to the patient 
even though similar facts might well occur with many other similarly situated 
patients. 
Finally, it is critical that the process for developing such a medical 
standard of care, whether the sponsor is a state, the federal government, or 
another appropriate authority, be credible.  To be credible, the process must be 
transparent and must involve appropriate and well-respected expert advisors, 
medical specialty societies, voluntary health organizations and other 
individuals and organizations that the public recognizes have an appropriate 
role in establishing medical standards.96  The policy-making process must also 
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garner all available empirical research, as it is critical that it reflects the latest 
clinical and health services research rather than simply the opinions of specific 
physicians, however notable.  In addition, the process should also reflect the 
concept of “appropriateness” of services in that the potential health benefits of 
the service exceed the potential harms or risks by a margin.97 
3. Using Legislative Facts to Establish Damages and Compensation 
Administrative agencies have become quite systematic in their 
measurement of damages.  Most public compensation programs administered 
by agencies, such as the Social Security Disability Insurance program, 98 
Department of Labor Workers’ Compensation programs,99 and Veterans 
Disability programs,100 award benefits pursuant to predetermined schedules 
based on specific types and degrees of injury or illness.  These schedules 
permit the award of compensation through consultation with the relevant 
schedules and without litigation in most cases. 
Several scholars have suggested scheduling damages in medical 
malpractice cases as a means of bringing rationality and consistency to injury 
compensation in medical malpractice.101  While it is beyond the scope of this 
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article to analyze these proposed schemes in great detail, it is important to 
emphasize that they address the exact same issues as statutory compensation 
schemes—the nature, severity, and permanency of the injury.  The level of 
compensation for injuries of a specific nature, severity, and permanency are all 
issues that can be independently determined without reference to specific 
individuals.  As such, they are legislative facts. 
As legislative facts, states or even the federal government could establish 
the nature, severity and permanency of medical injuries as well as associated 
compensation levels in a policy-making process.  Already, the Severity of 
Injury Scale developed by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, which ranges from one (emotional injury only) to nine 
(death), is widely used as a measure of the severity and duration of disability in 
the insurance industry.102 
How these facts are determined is important because process is the major 
force that accords credibility to the determination of legislative facts.  
Sponsoring authorities, such as states, should constitute expert panels 
composed of representatives from interested parties, including former 
malpractice litigants, to develop schedules of injury compensation for purposes 
of compensating malpractice claims.  Appropriate interests represented include 
physicians, insurers, disability and long-term care professionals, and financial 
experts.  To assure transparency and credibility, the meetings of the panel 
should be regular, public, and offer an opportunity for other interested parties 
to present views and information to the panel.  The reports of the panel should 
also be available to the public, who will have an opportunity to comment on 
drafts that will be incorporated into final products.  This type of process is very 
typical of administrative policy-making processes. 
It is also important that compensation schedules be empirically grounded.  
Such a condition presumes that the schedule will be based on empirical 
research of what existing statutory compensation schemes pay and the 
experience of claimants with respect to needs met and other benefits under 
these schemes.  The empirical research should also address the levels of 
compensation under existing accident and disability compensation schemes to 
gain political support for the adoption of compensation schedules for 
malpractice.  Finally, should compensation schedules be implemented, it is 
critical that they be evaluated empirically.  Administrative agencies have great 
experience in the design and implementation of empirical studies for the 
evaluation of government programs, including demonstrations of innovative 
approaches to public problems. 
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The remaining argument against using damage schedules is that they do 
not allow the unique characteristics of specific individuals to justify variation 
from the common schedules.  Such differences could easily be accommodated 
in much the same way as the concept of special damages in tort law addresses 
such exigencies.  Specifically, special damages would be available when the 
plaintiff sustains a special type of damage unique to him or her.103  The 
definition of the circumstances or the rules for determining eligibility for 
special damages would clearly have to be quite tight to resist pressures to 
obtain special damages in unwarranted circumstances where the claimant did 
not incur truly unique damage. 
B. Risk Analysis in the Regulation of Risks to Health and Safety and its 
Application to Malpractice 
Modern regulation targeted to reduce or eliminate risks to human health 
and safety began with public health regulation in the nineteenth century.  It 
accelerated after World War II and the concurrent period of great confidence in 
the contributions of technology to human well-being.  Specifically, in the 
1960s concerns emerged as to the degree to which various technology-based 
activities posed risks to human health and safety.  The emergence of the 
environmental movement is exemplary of this development.  By the end of the 
1960s, a sea change occurred in the public attitudes toward technology from 
relatively unquestioned acceptance of technology to concerns about its risks to 
human health and safety. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Congress enacted a host of new 
statutes establishing new regulatory programs to reduce the risks to human 
health and safety in the environment, the workplace and other settings.104  In 
response to this substantial increase in federal regulation of health and safety 
risks, the business community and political conservatives sought to roll back 
the scope of these new regulatory programs.  Immediately after his 
inauguration, Republican President Ronald Regan adopted Executive Order 
12,291, with Executive Order 12,498, following.105  These executive orders 
required cost-benefit analysis for major rules promulgated by federal 
administrative agencies as well as a regulatory impact analysis for major rules. 
The debate over risk analysis, which was so divisive during the 1980s, has 
largely been resolved in the U.S.  The federal government sponsored many 
high-level studies of risk analysis by expert panels during this period to clarify 
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the role of risk analysis in federal regulation.106  Now there is wide acceptance 
of the concept that risk-benefit analysis is an appropriate component of 
regulation.  All presidents after Reagan, including Democratic President Bill 
Clinton, issued executive orders requiring cost-benefit analysis in major 
rulemaking proceedings. 
In conjunction with these developments, various types of risk-benefit 
analysis have evolved to address different conceptions of proper approaches to 
such analysis.  In addition, scholars and policy-makers in administrative law 
and policy science have paid considerable attention to improvement of the 
regulation of risks to health and safety.  Scholars have analyzed whether risks 
are defined and measured correctly. 107  In more recent years, scholarship has 
critiqued the assumptions and associated techniques used in regulatory risk 
analysis to determine if a particular regulatory intervention is appropriate.108 
1. Methods of Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis is the balancing of the risks of an enterprise and the benefits 
to be obtained from the enterprise.109  Over the years, epidemiologists, 
toxicologists, and other physical and social scientists have developed methods 
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for analyzing risk.110  It involves an assessment of the nature of a risk, the 
population exposed to the risk, and the selection of one or more common 
measures of the risk, such as deaths, injuries, or variations thereof.  Also, an 
extensive body of mathematical and epidemiological techniques has been 
developed to estimate and calculate risk as well as its magnitude and 
probability.111  In addition, methods have been developed to address the 
phenomena of uncertainty and variability—factors which are an inherent part 
of risk.112 
A major concern of scholars and other observers is that inaccurate public 
perception of risk dominates risk-benefit analysis resulting in questionable 
regulatory policy.113  In the last twenty-five years, there has also been an 
extraordinary body of empirical research on risk perception that suggests 
public perceptions of particular risks and their comparative importance are 
quite inaccurate.114  This research indicates that the most important 
determinants of public perception of risk are qualitative factors grounded in 
cultural and psychological factors.  For example, qualitative variables such the 
voluntariness or familiarity of the risk will shape public perception of risk and, 
specifically, minimize risk in public perceptions in ways that are not warranted 
by empirical evidence of risk.  This research confirms the observation that the 
concept of risk itself is a sociological construct.115  The upshot has been the 
development of analytical approaches to the assessment of risk that endeavor 
to quantify the probability of risk of injury from specific activities. 
2. Use of Risk Analysis in Determining Foreseeability and Causation in 
Malpractice Adjudication 
The real potential contribution of regulatory risk analysis to tort is its 
methods for marshaling scientific and empirically tested information and 
methodologies to ascertain the nature of a particular risk and its harm, as well 
as the probability the risk of injury will occur and to what magnitude.  These 
methods of risk analysis assess risk in a more systematic fashion than does tort 
law, as discussed above,116 and remains a controversial issue among tort 
scholars, policy-makers and practitioners.  Specifically, the elements of duty 
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and causation both call for a determination of the foreseeability of the 
probability and magnitude of the risk, and, as discussed above, foreseeability 
has proven to be both a theoretical and empirical problem in the resolution of 
negligence cases.117 
Furthermore, under administrative law theory, many of the issues 
associated with the foreseeability and particularity of the risk of injury are 
legislative facts that can be determined independently of the circumstances of 
the parties.118  From this perspective, it is unnecessary to inquire whether there 
was a duty to foresee a risk as a matter of law in negligence cases because the 
risk was so remote and improbable.  This kind of determination in 
administrative law would be a legislative fact and would be highly dependent 
on scientific notions of causation and probability.119  To the extent that 
foreseeability of the risk of injury is a matter of breach of the standard of care 
or causation, much of the determination can be based on such legislative facts 
developed in epidemiological studies.120  As such, these approaches are 
consistent with the evidence-based medicine movement that informs the 
development of medical practice guidelines and other medical standards of 
care.121 
The most important potential contribution that modern regulatory risk 
analysis can make is the identification of the qualitative and often irrational 
factors that inform public perceptions of risk.  This latter effort, grounded on 
important empirical research on the fundamental irrationality of public 
perceptions of risks,122 demonstrates that such public perceptions may well 
influence juries and even judges in their decision making in negligence cases.  
Just as regulators have to respond to public perception of a particular risk, 
adjudicators of medical malpractice claims must recognize the issues 
associated with public perceptions of risk and take steps to ensure that decision 
makers, i.e., jury members, have accurate information about the probabilities 
and characteristics of the risk at issue.  At the very least, courts should 
recognize that empirical evidence on public perception of risk are also 
essentially legislative facts that can be established through expert testimony at 
trial or other sources of legislative facts such as empirical research.  Such 
information could do much to guide decision makers, including juries, in 
making more accurate assessments of relevant risks. 
In assessing the risk of injury in medical malpractice cases, decision 
makers in malpractice adjudication should insist on more rigor in the analysis 
 
 117. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 54–103. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 79–97. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 36–40. 
 122. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPROACHES TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM 71 
of the risk of injury to the victim.  They should appreciate that much of the 
issue of foreseeability of risk involves legislative facts that are not particular to 
the individual.  To the extent that relevant government-sponsored studies of 
particular risks are available, they should be available and introduced into 
evidence to clarify the risk analysis in the tort lawsuit. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This article does not suggest that the resolution of medical malpractice 
claims should be moved to a state agency, such as a state health department, or 
a federal agency, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  
Regarding transfer to a federal agency, tort law has traditionally been located 
within the province of state law.  Sovereign states have managed tort law with 
little interference from the federal courts, except in the case of diversity 
jurisdiction where the federal courts have deferred to prevailing state law.123  
Likewise, Congress has been reluctant to interfere directly in state tort law.  
Only when it has perceived that there are threats to the health and safety of the 
population has Congress intervened and established a regulatory program.124  
Also, Congress has been willing to establish statutory injury compensation 
schemes for groups of workers with specific injuries as well as groups of 
workers with specific conditions such as brown lung disease and workers, such 
as longshoremen, working in nationwide industries.125 
This article assumes that, in all likelihood, the adjudication and 
compensation of medical malpractice claims will remain in state courts under 
state law.  Indeed, there are many reasons it is desirable to leave the 
adjudication of malpractice claims with state trial judges.  First, these judges 
are established and have experience in the adjudication of medical issues and 
tort law.  Second, the depth and sophistication of administrative law judges 
across states is inconsistent.  Some states have central panels of well-paid and 
knowledgeable administrative law judges, while others use administrative law 
judges on a less systematic basis and often hire outside lawyers or use internal 
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staff to adjudicate disputes.126  Given the realities of state budgets, 127 it is 
unlikely that states would be willing to add major responsibilities to a central 
panel of ALJs or to develop the requisite ALJ corps to adjudicate malpractice 
claims. 
However, it is not necessary to lodge adjudication of malpractice claims in 
an administrative agency to take advantage of fact-finding and analysis 
techniques used by administrative agencies of the type described above.  These 
administrative law approaches can be enacted by statute or court rule and used 
in the resolution of conventional state tort causes of action.  Whatever the 
venue, administrative law, in particular its concept of legislative facts and 
techniques of risk analysis, can contribute much to the expeditious and just 
adjudication and compensation of medical malpractice claims in the United 
States. 
 
 
 126. See Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State Central Panels, 21 J. 
NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235 (2001); Allen Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State 
Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75 (1994), reprinted in 14 J. NAT’L. ASS’N. 
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 107 (1994); see also Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a 
Bridge between Law and Culture, 23 J. NAT’L. ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (2003). 
 127. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES: JUNE 2001, (2001), 
available at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/PDFs/FSJUN2001.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS 
ASS’N, STATES FACE UNPRECEDENTED BUDGET SHORTFALLS, (Dec. 10, 2001), available at 
http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/1,1169,C_PRESS_RELEASE^D_2945,00.html; MARK M. 
ZANDI, THE OUTLOOK FOR STATE TAX REVENUES (2001), available at http://www.nga.org/cda/ 
files/TaxRevenues.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, STATES’ BUDGET FORECAST CLOUDY, (Dec. 
18, 2000), available at http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/1,1169,C_PRESS_RELEASE^D_ 
624,00.html. 
